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BRITISH TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA IN 
THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH 
CENTURIES 
Victor Bulmer-Thomas 
British trade with Latin America did not begin with Independence in the 1820s.1 
Through both legal and illegal channels, Britain had been supplying Latin 
America with goods and slaves before Independence and directly purchasing 
modest quantities of exports. However, the Iberian colonial system - even after 
the Bourbon reforms in the 18th century - limited British economic influence 
substantially and ruled out all forms of inward investment. Thus, Independence 
is rightly seen as something of a watershed in economic relations between 
Britain and Latin America. 
Superficially, Britain and Latin America appeared to be made for each other 
in the 19th century. With its strong manufacturing base, a consequence of nearly 
two centuries of industrial modernisation, Britain was well-placed to supply the 
newly independent countries2 with manufactured imports. Britain was also a 
major source of capital exports and in a strong position to meet the Latin 
American demand for foreign savings. Meanwhile Latin America, freed from the 
obligation to sell its primary products through Iberian outlets, was able to 
expand its exports to meet the growing demand in Britain for food and raw 
materials. 
This apparent complementarity between Britain and Latin America proved 
more difficult to establish than was at first anticipated. Britain operated a system 
of colonial preference until the mid-19th century and market access for Latin 
America's exports suffered accordingly.3 Even after the repeal of the Corn Laws 
in 1846 and the adoption of free trade by Britain, its colonies continued to 
operate a system of imperial preference, favouring British imports over those 
from other industrial countries. Thus, British exporters faced a playing field 
tilted towards the colonies and, not surprisingly, often preferred the rich pickings 
in the dominions to the more 'neutral' markets in Latin America. 
On the Latin American side, each country inherited from its colonial past a 
rich array of cottage industries that could only survive the full blast of 
international competition through tariff protection. Since the tariff was the major 
Although British investment in Latin America will be mentioned in this paper, it is not the 
main subject. For an excellent analysis of UK investment flows to Latin America in recent years, 
see IRELA/IDB (1998). 
2 Those countries that remained colonies in the 19th century (e.g. Cuba and Puerto Rico) also 
had much more freedom than before to buy from the cheapest source. Thus, it is not generally 
necessary to distinguish between republics and colonies after the 1820s. 
3 See Miller (1993). 
source of public revenue for Latin American countries in the 19th century, all 
governments - even those in favour of free trade - provided some degree of 
protection for their artisan industries, and the protective wall in the interior 
provinces was raised even further by high transport costs. Thus, cottage 
industries survived for many years in Latin America, limiting the scope for 
British manufactured exports. 
British influence on the Latin American economies in the first half of the 
19th century has, therefore, almost certainly been exaggerated - as we shall see 
below. The experience in the second half of the century, however, was much 
more positive and this is explored in the second part of the paper. Latin 
American countries slowly overcame the instability associated with the first 
decades of Independence and new sources of exports were developed for which 
the British market was, in most cases, well-suited. As the economies grew, the 
opportunities for British exports of goods, services and capital increased. 
By the time of the First World War, Britain had been overtaken by the 
United States as a trading partner in most countries and its aggregate 
performance was heavily influenced by trade with Argentina - the most 
important market in Latin America - where British influence remained 
substantial. These trends continued after the war and by the 1930s British trade 
and investment in Latin America was crucially dependent on developments in 
Argentina. 
As Britain lost its leading position in Argentina after the 1930s, its trade 
links with Latin America were reduced, and this theme is developed in part 
three. By 1970, as shown in part four, Britain was underperforming in many 
Latin American markets and no amount of official hand-wringing and 
exhortation appeared to make any difference. With the loss of the Argentine 
market following the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982, British trade links with 
Latin America reached their nadir. In addition, the threat of debt default in the 
1980s, and the loan-loss provisions made by British financial institutions, 
seemed to mark a permanent withdrawal of British capital from the region. 
Since 1990 there has been a significant increase in British exports to Latin 
America, but this has not prevented a further decline in the British share of 
imports in most Latin American countries. The reasons for this apparent paradox 
are explored in part five, where it is shown that the apparent improvement in 
British export performance is above all due to the exceptionally rapid growth of 
Latin American imports since 1990 - a growth that was not sustainable in the 
long run and which has been eroded since 1997 by the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis. 
The First Phase: From Independence to Mid-Century 
The struggle for independence in Latin America, coinciding as it did with the 
Napoleonic Wars in Europe, provided Britain with its first opportunity to break 
the Iberian grip on commercial trade. British merchants, facing the closure of 
many of their traditional markets in continental Europe, were quick to take 
advantage of this. As Napoleon's troops marched into Spain in 1808, no less 
than 40 per cent of British exports were despatched to Latin America - a figure 
that has never been matched either before or since.4 
The initial enthusiasm soon gave way to disillusionment as many of these 
exports failed to find a buyer. The purchasing power of the Latin American 
elites had been wildly exaggerated and many of the goods sent out to the region 
were quite inappropriate. British merchants were quick to settle in the coastal 
ports through which the bulk of foreign trade passed, but their hopes of short-
term profits were generally not met. Many returned to the United Kingdom or 
moved elsewhere, leaving only a small number to handle the diminished trade.5 
By 1860 UK exports to Latin America were 7.0 per cent of total UK exports 
(see Table 1) - a respectable figure, although a far cry from the high share of 50 
years earlier. 
Table 1. British Exports to Latin America as a Percentage of Total UK Exports 
Argentina 12.9 40.8 53.8 24.3 16.3 2.8 11.7 
Brazil 31.4 22.6 14.4 11.1 20.6 25.1 30.2 
Chile 12.1 10.8 4.6 7.8 5.3 9.8 8.1 
Colombia 5.7 3.1 9.3(d) 5.4 3.9 4.7 6.5 
Mexico 3.6 4.0 2.4 12.0 17.7 20.0 11.8 
Peru 10.0 2.7 2.9 4.7 1.3 2.2 2.6 
Venezuela 2.1 1.4 (f) 16.1 12.4 15.7 8.6 
Rest of South 
America (a) 
7.2 8.1 6.9(e) 8.9 13.9 10.3 12.8 
Central 
America 
1.4 2.0 2.9 4.0 3.9 4.3 4.8 
Rest of Latin 
America (b) 
13.6(c) 4.5 2.9 5.7 4.7 5.1 2.8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 
(a) Includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(b) Includes Cuba, Haiti and Dominican Republic. 
(c) Includes Puerto Rico. 
(d) Includes Ecuador and Venezuela. 
(e) Includes Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(0 Included in figure for Colombia 
Sources: 
Piatt (1972); Miller (1993); Atkinson (1989); IMF (1997). 
4 See Piatt (1972), p.28. 
5 See Piatt (1972); Miller (1993). 
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Recognition of the independent republics by Britain and other countries in 
the 1820s led, in some cases, to commercial treaties that might have paved the 
way for better trading conditions. However, with the exceptions of Brazil and 
Chile, the first decades of Independence were marred by chronic political 
instability. The spectacular economic growth forecast by so many at the onset of 
Independence failed to materialise and British exports in 1850 were still only 
half the levels registered forty years earlier.6 Britain enjoyed a high share of 
Latin America's imports at mid-century - over 50 per cent in the case of Brazil 
(the main market)7 - but better opportunities elsewhere had reduced the share of 
British exports to Latin America to less than 10 per cent. Britain was the main 
source of Latin America's imports, but it had become a minor market for British 
exports. 
There were several reasons for the lack of dynamism in the first decades after 
Independence. High tariff barriers in Latin America excluded many British 
goods despite their international competitiveness; British exporters enjoyed 
preferential access in colonial markets, where there was a natural desire to 
favour British imports over those from other countries; and there was a 
reluctance among British firms to adjust product lines to the needs of the small 
Latin American markets. The main reason, however, for the lack of dynamism 
was the slow growth of the Latin American market for imports. 
That slow growth was a consequence of the supply-side bottlenecks that 
Latin American economies faced after Independence. While land was in 
abundant supply, labour and capital were scarce. The new republics - or empire 
in the case of Brazil - had turned to Britain in the 1820s to provide the foreign 
capital needed to recapitalise the mines and stabilise government revenue, but 
commercial misjudgement, greed and corruption had led to default on almost all 
these loans by the end of the decade. It took a generation to wipe out this 
collective memory, leaving Latin America without access to the international 
markets, as London was the dominant financial centre at that time. 
If Latin America had been able to rapidly expand its exports to Britain, the 
situation would have been much improved. However, British colonial preference 
(before the 1850s) gave an advantage to exports from the colonies for all 
products except those, such as guano, where Latin America had a regional 
monopoly for a time. Furthermore, one of Latin America's most important 
exports - silver - was less in demand once Britain went onto the gold standard 
in 1815. And Latin America's exports were held back by the very same supply-
side bottlenecks that limited the growth of the economies as a whole. UK 
imports from Latin America fluctuated in those years as a percentage of total UK 
imports, but never rose above ten per cent (see Table 2). 
6 See Piatt (1972), pp. 28 and 30. 
7 See Bulmer-Thomas (1997). 
Table 2. UK Imports from Latin America as a Percentage of 
Total UK Imports 
1804/6 (a) 2.3 1929 (b) 10.6 
1814/6 (a) 8.7 1938 (b) 7.7 
1824/6 (a) 4.7 1950 (c) 7.8 
1844/6 (a) 6.0 1960 (c) 6.7 
1854/6 (a) 6.4 1970 (c) 3.7 
1880(b) 4.5 1980 (c) 2.1 
1900 (b) 5.2 1990 (d) 1.1 
1913(b) 9.9 1995(d) 1.6 
Notes: 
(a) Miller (1993), p. 77, quoting Davis (1979). 
(b) Miller (1993), p. 107, derived from Mitchell and Deane (1962). 
(c) Atkinson (1989). 
(d) IMF (1997). 
During those first decades of Independence, British prestige and influence 
was considerable. Recognition of Latin American Independence by the British 
government was considered crucial for their survival by the new republics and 
Britain was much admired for its industrial and naval superiority. The Monroe 
Doctrine may have been promulgated in 1823, but Britain never felt restrained 
by it and, indeed, the Doctrine itself was an attempt to block Britain and other 
European powers from exerting the hegemonic role previously taken by Spain 
and Portugal. Inevitably, this has given rise to a controversy over the extent to 
which this influence was used to promote British economic interests at the 
expense of both rival producers and the Latin American countries themselves. 
There is certainly some evidence of British abuse of power. The first trade 
treaties with Brazil were one-sided affairs designed to give Britain a privileged 
position for its manufactured exports; British diplomacy was largely responsible 
for the creation of Uruguay in 1828 and force was used in the 1840s to defend 
the fledgling republic from the territorial ambitions of General Rosas in 
Argentina; British diplomats manoeuvred intensely to ensure influence over any 
inter-oceanic route that might be built in Central America and to keep open the 
waterways of South America to British shipping. Britain became increasingly 
irritated at Brazil's failure to end the trade in slaves and force was used on 
occasions. 
It would be wrong, however, to assume from this that British influence made 
much difference to Latin America's economic development. With the exception 
Year IVrrentiige Mar I'mcntai^c 
of Brazil before 1844, Latin American tariffs did not favour British imports and 
some countries - notably Mexico - were able to adopt a tariff structure that was 
overtly protectionist without provoking British ire. British diplomacy at this time 
was more concerned with limiting the influence of other powers, such as France 
and the United States, and less with securing privileged positions for its 
economic agents. This arose less from principle and more from the knowledge 
that British competitiveness in the export of goods and capital would be 
sufficient to secure the advantage, provided that other foreign powers were not 
favoured. 
British diplomacy was not unsuccessful, but by mid-century it had already 
been eclipsed by the United States in the countries north of Colombia. The 
Mexican-American War (1845-46), with its transfer of territory to the United 
States, had shown European powers the advantages of geographical proximity. 
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 limited British territorial ambitions in 
Central America and ensured that Britain would not have control of any inter-
oceanic route that might be built. Even in Cuba and Puerto Rico, still ruled by 
Spain, it was US commercial influence - not British - that was expanding most 
rapidly. By mid-century British trade with Latin America was already heavily 
concentrated in the southern cone, with exports to Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
exceeding those to all other countries in Latin America. Thus, a pattern of 
British trade was soon established that was to survive well into the 20th century. 
The Second Phase: From Mid-Century to the 1920s 
In the mid-19th century a series of changes took place that allowed economic 
relations between Britain and Latin America to flourish. Now at last the 
potential identified by so many commentators on either side of the Atlantic at the 
time of Independence could blossom. The 'natural' complementarity between 
the world's greatest industrial power and a region blessed with the capacity to 
produce cheap raw materials and foodstuffs finally materialised. With no 
European wars to distract Britain and a Latin America - with the tragic 
exception of the War of the Triple Alliance in the 1860s - largely free from 
military conflict, both partners were free to seek an economic division of labour 
that maximised the gains from trade without the interference of strategic or 
security considerations. 
The first change was Britain's commitment to the abolition of colonial 
preference and the adoption of zero tariffs. This extreme version of free trade 
has few parallels in economic history and was to last, with only minor 
exceptions, until the 1932 Ottawa Conference re-established imperial 
preference. British importers were now free to purchase goods from the cheapest 
source and this provided an opportunity for Latin America that had previously 
been absent. Sugar exporters were the main beneficiary and British imports from 
Cuba and Puerto Rico rose accordingly. However, free trade also meant that the 
protection previously provided to local farmers disappeared; Latin American 
produce could now replace high-cost British farm output of temperate products. 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay began to respond and the initial success 
encouraged the entry of British capital into South American farming. A virtuous 
circle was soon created with Argentina as the main beneficiary. 
The second change was the commitment of Latin American countries to 
export-led growth. Latin American elites were persuaded by the economic gains 
to be reaped from trade, demonstrated by Ricardo's law of comparative 
advantage and eloquently expounded by John Stuart Mill. Unlike Britain's 
commitment to free trade, this did not imply zero tariffs and - for both revenue 
and protective reasons - tariffs remained in place. However, Latin American 
governments lost their enthusiasm for the protection of their cottage industries 
and this created new opportunities for the export of British manufactures. These 
opportunities increased as improvements in infrastructure in general, and the 
transport system in particular, eroded the implicit protection given to domestic 
producers in the interior provinces. 
The third change was the return of foreign capital. Latin American 
governments once again tapped the London bond markets and, despite 
widespread default in the 1870s and the Baring crisis in 1890, continued to do 
so up until the First World War. The flow of portfolio capital was followed by 
direct foreign investment, with Britain leading the field among the industrial 
countries. The main attraction was railways, with British capital being used to 
develop Latin America's first railway in Cuba in the 1830s; but almost all 
sectors received some attention. And trade inevitably followed capital flows, 
with British exports to each country closely correlated to the extent of British 
investment.8 
The fourth change was migration of British labour. Although this never 
reached the scale achieved by other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, 
Portugal or Germany, it was important for its quality. British migrants brought 
with them skills and capital and this gave them an influence out of all proportion 
to their numbers. The small British communities generated an English-language 
press throughout Latin America, which was an additional way in which their 
influence spread to the local elites.9 And the flow of labour was not all in one 
direction. Once the age of steam travel arrived, the journey to Europe became 
less daunting and a number of Latin American leaders spent time in the United 
Kingdom.10 
In the light of all these changes, British economic hegemony in Latin 
America might have seemed assured. However, Britain began to lose market 
share in Latin America after 1870, as shown in Table 3. Furthermore, the decline 
would have been more serious if Britain had not succeeded in keeping a strong 
grip on the Argentine market - by far the most important Latin American 
economy in terms of foreign trade by the end of the century. By 1913, for 
example, Britain's share of Latin America's imports was 50 per cent higher than 




See Piatt (1972), Fig. V, p. 281. 
See Marshall (1996). 
See Decho and Diamond (1998). 
both Britain's presence in the Argentine market and the size of that market itself. 
Thus, British economic supremacy was not as great as might have been expected 
and, although the high shares recorded in mid-century could not be permanently 
sustained, the relative decline does require some explanation. 
Table 3. Latin American Imports and Exports: Percentage from and to UK: 
c.1850-1938 
c. 1850(a) 31.3 30.4 31.0 30.2 
c. 1870(a) 32.0 30.9 32.4 33.5 
c. 1890(a) 27.1 23.7 12.0 11.0 
1913 24.8 16.0 20.7 16.9 
1938 12.2 10.0 15.9 10.6 
Notes: 
(a) I have used Bulmer-Thomas (1994) for Latin America's exports in these years and also assumed 
Latin America's exports and imports to be equal. I have used Piatt (1972) for UK exports and imports 
to/from Latin America. I have then adjusted UK imports from Latin America by deducting transport 
costs and UK exports to Latin America by adding transport costs estimated at 25% c.1850, 12.5% 
c.1870 and 10% c. 1890. 
(b) Argentina has been excluded from both the numerator and denominator, i.e. the figures refer to non-
Argentine Latin American imports/exports from/to UK as a percentage of total non-Argentine Latin 
American imports/exports. 
The first problem was British export dependence on textiles. Britain's 
success in importing raw cotton and wool for the fabrication of textiles was 
phenomenal. Even as late as 1910-13, Britain still held 70 per cent of world 
trade in cotton textiles despite competition from the rest of Europe, the United 
States, India and Japan.11 Inevitably, British manufactured exports were skewed 
towards textiles, which in 1880 accounted for 62.3 per cent of the manufactured 
total and were still nearly 50 per cent in 1913.12 While Latin American 
governments were content to see the decline of their cottage textile industries, 
Britain's dependence on textile exports was a source of strength. However, the 
modern textile industry was one of the first candidates for import substitution 
and Latin American efforts to promote the industry led inevitably to a decline in 
imports from Britain. Only Argentina bucked the trend, continuing to rely very 
heavily on imports of textiles to the benefit of trade with Britain.13 
The second problem was foreign - particularly US - competition. Latin 
11 See Piatt (1972), Table XI, p. 176. 
12 See Piatt (1972), Table III, p. 73. 
13 In 1910-11, Argentina still only had six textile factories compared with 137 in Brazil and 139 
in Mexico. See Piatt (1972), Table XIII, p. 182. 
Year Imports Imports Exports Exports 
Excluding Excluding 
Argentina (b) Argentina (b) 
America, freed from colonial powers, was a 'neutral' market for exporters. For 
those countries without imperial possessions, this was one of the few foreign 
markets where they were assured a reasonably level playing field. The United 
States, a major industrial power by the mid-19th century, was quick to seize the 
opportunities provided by geography and rapidly replaced Britain as the main 
source of imports in the northern republics. Only in Argentina was the US 
advance halted and this was due to a variety of factors: high transport costs, 
competition from Britain (particularly in textiles) and the trade friction between 
Argentina and the USA as a result of their export of similar agro-industrial 
products.14 
If Britain had fought harder - outside Argentina - to preserve its market 
share, it might have succeeded despite its dependence on textile exports. At the 
very least, it would have slowed down the rate at which market share was being 
lost. However, Britain faced a captive market in most of its colonies and 
dominions, where purchasing power was often much higher than in Latin 
America. These markets were not neutral, with tariff and other preferences being 
given to British exporters. Thus, Britain could expect to capture anything 
between 50 and 90 per cent of these markets except for Canada, where US 
competition was too strong. And these were large markets dwarfing those of 
most Latin American countries. Australia, for example, in 1912 had total imports 
of £78 million with Britain supplying 50 per cent. 
The relative decline in British trade with Latin America was concealed by 
the strong performance in the Argentine market (see Table 4). A high market 
share in the country with the highest level of imports was bound to reflect well 
on the aggregate statistics, particularly as the level of Argentine imports was also 
growing rapidly for most of the period after 1850. The emphasis on Argentina 
was underpinned, and reinforced, by the scale of capital flows to that country. 
By 1890, on the eve of the Baring crisis, nearly 40 per cent of British 
investments in Latin America were in Argentina and this had changed little by 
1913 despite a doubling of the value of the total capital stock in the region. 
British pre-eminence in foreign investment in Latin America was not in fact 
seriously challenged before the First World War. It has been estimated that in 
1913 British investments were worth £999.2 million compared with £339 
million for the USA, £329 million for France and £185 million for Germany. 
Thus, Britain had a far higher share of foreign investment (c. 50%) in Latin 
America in 1913 than its share of foreign trade (c. 25%) - a pattern that has 
continued to this day. While this is not surprising, given the dominance of 
London as a world financial centre, it is remarkable that perhaps a quarter of all 
British foreign investments were to be found in Latin America.15 Although this 
was less than the proportion for the United States, it was more than for France or 
Germany. 
While the USA exported manufactured goods, it also produced and exported the raw 
materials in which Argentina had found its comparative advantage. US tariffs to protect its farm 
industry were a constant source of irritation for Argentina. 
15 See Piatt (1972), pp. 288-9. 
Table 4. Argentina's Share of UK Trade with Latin America (%) 
1870 11.8 5.9 
1890 28.4 25.5 
1910 35.4 42.6 
1920 37.5 59.4 
1930 46.5 55.6 
1938 53.9 52.3 
1950 25.0 47.1 
1960 25.5 47.1 
1970 15.7 19.5 
1980 16.4 10.8 
1990 2.7 7.7 
1995 10.6 10.1 
Sources: derived from Piatt (1972); Miller (1993); Atkinson (1989); and IMF (1997). 
British investment in Latin America was curtailed by the First World War, 
and the emergence in the 1920s of New York as a major financial centre 
deprived London of its near monopoly on new issues. The United States began 
to challenge British hegemony in capital flows to Latin America, although a 
large part of the stock remained in British hands. With the onset of the 1929 
depression, and a further round of defaults, British investors began to rue their 
heavy dependence on the Latin American market. 
The Third Phase: From the Great Depression to the Debt 
Crisis 
By the end of the 1920s, Britain still held a strong position in the trade and 
inward investment of Latin America. However, trade performance was very 
dependent on Argentina, both as a source of demand for British exports and as a 
source of supply for British imports (see Table 4). And the investment portfolio 
was geared towards government bonds and public utilities (including transport). 
In the next 20 years, British influence was to be sharply eroded as a result of the 
impact of the Great Depression and the Second World War. 
Import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) did not begin with the 1929 
depression, but it was given a significant boost by the tariff and exchange rate 
changes forced on Latin American governments by the collapse of commodity 
prices. The value of imports fell to a quarter of their pre-depression level and 
Year UK Exports to UK Imports from 
Argentina Argentina 
exports from all industrial countries to Latin America were affected. Default on 
the external debt by all Latin American countries except Argentina, the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti released foreign exchange that could then be used 
to increase imports from their low point in 1932, but it was many years before 
they returned to their pre-depression level.16 
Most countries did not abandon the promotion of primary product exports 
altogether and the region's exports recovered after 1932 as the net barter terms 
of trade improved. Access to the British market, however, became more difficult 
with the adoption of imperial preference at the 1932 Ottawa Conference, while 
the United States made strenuous efforts under Secretary of State Cordell Hull to 
establish a series of bilateral trade treaties giving partial market access to Latin 
American exports. Germany under Hitler adopted its own form of preferential 
trade, offering Latin American primary product exporters higher prices in return 
for payment in inconvertible aski-marks that could only be exchanged for 
German goods. The playing field, never completely level, became tilted against 
exports to Britain for the first time in almost a century. By 1938 (see Table 3), 
Latin America's exports to Britain had fallen to 15.9 per cent of total exports -
half the level of 1850. 
Argentina was the Latin American country most affected by imperial 
preference, closely followed by Uruguay. The prospect of trade diversion in 
favour of the empire led to the 1933 Roca-Runciman Treaty giving Argentina a 
guaranteed quota in the British market for her main exports in return for 
Argentina's preferential treatment of British manufactured goods.17 However, 
the treaty generated strong nationalist feelings against Britain and could not 
reverse the decline of British influence that had begun with the depression. 
The reasons for this are complex, but can be summarised as follows: 
Argentina promoted ISI aggressively in the 1930s and the under-developed 
textile industry was an easy target; this led to the decline of imports in a sector 
where Britain was still strongly represented. The UK quotas for Argentine 
exports may have given a lifeline to some agro-industries, but they were never 
increased and in some cases were reduced as other suppliers responded to the 
opportunities provided by imperial preference. Britain still enjoyed a high share 
of Argentine imports, helped in part by tariff preferences under the Roca-
Runciman Treaty, but those imports had ceased to grow. Argentina continued to 
service its external debt, mainly owed to the United Kingdom, but British firms 
were no longer able to invest in Argentina and existing British investments 
became seriously under-capitalised. 
Argentina's withdrawal from world trade began in the 1930s. British trade 
dependence on Argentina inevitably affected Britain's trade performance with 
the whole of Latin America. By 1938, the last normal year before the Second 
World War, the UK share of the region's imports had fallen to 12.2 per cent (see 
Table 3) - almost exactly half of its share in 1913 - and imports no longer 
See Bulmer-Thomas (1994), Chapter 7. 
A similar treaty was signed between Britain and Uruguay. 
played the same role in the regional economy as a result of the strengthening of 
ISI. The share of exports destined for Britain also fell and would have fallen 
further without the special treatment given to Argentina. The Roca-Runciman 
Treaty was an important factor in the preservation of the United Kingdom as a 
major export market for Latin America. 
British influence in Latin America was further undermined by the Second 
World War, although this was assumed by most to be a temporary affair. The 
threat posed by the German navy to sea routes across the Atlantic made trade 
with Latin America hazardous and imports from the region were limited to those 
deemed essential for the war effort. However, despite the difficulty of payment 
(mainly in inconvertible sterling), the British market was one of the few 
European markets left open to Latin America and the United Kingdom was still 
receiving more than ten per cent of the region's exports by 1945. It was in the 
area of imports that Britain was eclipsed, with the UK share of Latin America's 
imports falling to 3.6 per cent in 1945. 
Post-war European recovery, particularly after the adoption of the Marshall 
Plan in 1948, at first suggested that the optimists were correct. Britain had 
rebuilt its share of Latin America's imports to 6.8 per cent by 1950 with 7.1 per 
cent of British exports going to the region and 7.8 per cent of UK imports 
coming from the region (see Table 2). However, these impressive figures proved 
to be unsustainable: in the next forty years, the trade shares - looked at either 
from Britain or Latin America - declined steadily. Just before the debt crisis and 
the war with Argentina in 1982, only two per cent of Latin America's imports 
came from Britain (far below Britain's five per cent share of world imports) and 
only 2.2 per cent of British exports went to Latin America (see Table 1). 
This relative decline of the trade links between Britain and Latin America 
has been the subject of much analysis.18 Britain was being pulled towards 
Europe even before it joined the European Economic Community (now 
European Union (EU)) in 1973. Imperial preference was replaced by the Lome 
Convention under the EU, giving preferences mainly to former British and 
French colonies and excluding Latin America.19 Britain failed to modernise its 
economy in response to the challenge from other European countries and the 
rising Asian economies. Regional integration in Latin America after 1960 also 
led to some trade diversion at the expense of Britain. 
There is some truth in all these arguments, but they would be incomplete 
without reference to Argentina. In 1950, Argentina still accounted for nearly half 
(47.1 per cent) of UK imports from Latin America and a quarter of her exports 
to the region (see Table 4). With the slow growth of the Argentine economy and 
its semi-closure to foreign trade, Britain inevitably lost market share in Latin 
America despite numerous trade missions and export drives. And with the war 
with Argentina in 1982, Anglo-Argentine trade came almost to a halt for nearly 
18 See, for example, Atkinson (1989). 
19 Haiti and the Dominican Republic, however, were allowed to join the Lome Convention at 
the end of the 1980s. 
ten years, leaving Brazil as the dominant trade partner for Britain in Latin 
America.20 
The relative decline of British trade links with Latin America was matched to 
a lesser extent by the eclipse of British investments. The 1938 nationalisation of 
the oil industry in Mexico, where British companies were well-entrenched, had 
been strongly resisted. However, the post-war British government was in no 
position to resist as Latin American governments expropriated British interests 
in water, gas, electricity and transport companies since the Attlee administration 
was doing the same in Britain. The jewel in the crown, the Argentine railway, 
was nationalised in 1948 by the Peron government using inconvertible sterling 
balances accumulated during and after the war. 
British outward investment after the war was at first held back by exchange 
control and the dollar premium. However, Britain - in common with other 
developed countries - showed a marked preference for direct investment in 
advanced economies. The traditional British pattern of investing in Asia, Africa 
and Latin America gave way to a new pattern favouring North America and the 
European Union. By 1981 these two regions accounted for nearly 60 per cent of 
the book value of UK outward direct investment compared to about one-third in 
1962.21 Yet Latin America's share (including the Caribbean) was still six per 
cent at the beginning of the 1980s - almost three times greater than Britain's 
share of Latin America's imports. 
This imbalance between British trade and investment shares in Latin 
America has already been noted for the earlier period. When British portfolio 
investment - including bank loans - is included, the difference becomes even 
more striking. British banks were heavily involved in the build-up of commercial 
loans to Latin America in the 1970s and were highly exposed at the time of the 
debt crisis. While Britain has underperformed with Latin America in trade terms 
(see next section), it has not done so in terms of investment. This is partly a 
reflection of the City of London's role as a major international financial centre 
(second only to New York), but is also an indication of the large number of 
British-based multinational companies (MNCs). These companies are now 
responsible for almost all direct foreign investment worldwide and their 
presence in Latin America must be seen as part of their global strategies to 
preserve or increase market share. 
An Econometric Test of UK Export Performance 
The assumption that Britain has underperformed in its exports to Latin America 
is widely held. Successive British governments have lamented the low level of 
trade with the region and contrasted it both with past trade performance and 
current investment flows to Latin America.22 Indeed, the assumption is so widely 
held that no questions were asked when the previous Conservative government 
20 See Bulmer-Thomas (1997). 
21 See Atkinson (1989). 
22 See, for example, Bonsor (1996). See also Foreign Affairs Committee (1997), p. xxii. 
announced in 1995 that it was seeking to double its share of Latin American 
imports in the next few years. 
Although underperformance is widely assumed, it has never been tested. Yet 
exports can be predicted and compared with actual performance using a number 
of international trade models. In this paper I use a standard gravity model to 
estimate British bilateral exports to all countries in all years from 1960 to 
1990.23 The dependent variable is British exports to country 'x' and the 
independent variables are as follows: 
i) Population in country 'x'; it is assumed that British exports ceteris paribus 
will be greater the larger the population in country 'x'. 
(ii) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per head in country 'x'; it is assumed 
that British exports ceteris paribus will be greater the higher the GDP per 
head in country 'x \ 
(iii) Distance from Britain to country 'x'; it is assumed that British exports 
ceteris paribus will be lower the greater the distance to country ' x \ 
(iv) Partner Island Dummy; if country 'x' is an island, the dummy variable 
assumes a value of 1 (otherwise 0) on the assumption that island economies 
have higher levels of trade ceteris paribus. 
(v) Common Language Dummy; if country 'x' uses English as the main 
language, the dummy variable assumes a value of 1 (otherwise 0) on the 
assumption that a common language makes for higher levels of British 
exports ceteris paribus. 
(vi) Partner Land-Locked Dummy; if country 'x' is landlocked, the dummy 
variable assumes a value of 1 (otherwise 0) on the assumption that 
landlocked countries have lower levels of trade ceteris paribus. 
(vii) European Community (EC)/European Union (EU) dummy; the dummy 
takes a value of 1 from 1973 when Britain joined the European Community. 
The assumption is that membership of the EC (EU after 1992) leads to 
higher British exports with member countries ceteris paribus. 
The model was tested using a Tobit Regression. This is preferable to 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression in cases where there are limited dependent 
variables (as happens with bilateral trade as it cannot fall below zero). All 
variables were estimated using logarithms and the results are presented in Table 
5 for 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. 
23 I am grateful to Hernan Vallejo for providing the data and running the regressions on which 
this section is based. 
Table 5. Tobit Regressions for Gravity Model of UK Exports 
1960 85 0.65* 1.03* -0.43* 0.17 1.42* -0.68 na -9.70* 0.3697 
1970 117 0.62* 1.14* -0.46* 0.34 1.04* -0.63* na -9.85* 0.4083 
1980 145 0.77* 0.94* -0.84* 0.37 1.29* -0.73* -0.45 -7.79* 0.3799 
1990 148 0.77* 1.04* -0.67* 0.05 1.11* -0.43* -0.28 -10.1* 0.4431 
Notes: 
(1) Number of Observations. 
(2) Population. 
(3) GDP per head. 
(4) Distance. 
(5) Partner Island Dummy. 
(6) Common Language Dummy. 
(7) Partner Landlocked Dummy. 
(8) European Community/European Union Dummy. 
(9) Constant. 
(10) Pseudo-R squared. 
* Significant at 1% level. 
The estimated coefficients all have the predicted sign with the exception of 
the EU/EC dummy, which is negative (although not significant). This suggests 
that EC/EU membership had been anticipated by British exporters so that entry 
in 1973 did not bring a quantitative leap in exports. The Partner Island Dummy 
coefficient has the predicted sign, but it is not significant. 
The model results can then be used to predict the value of British exports to 
all Latin American countries for each year. The results are presented in Table 6 
for 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990. The overall impression of underperformance is 
confirmed, but the picture is much more complex than originally expected. In 
particular, it appears that British underperformance, far from being a 
'permanent' feature, is of relatively recent origin. 
As late as 1960, Britain was in fact 'overperforming' in its exports to Latin 
America, as the first section of Table 6 makes clear. Much of this was due to 
Argentina, but what is interesting about the 1960 results is that British exports 
were equal to, or above, the predicted levels in all except two markets (Central 
America and Haiti/Dominican Republic). Exports to Mexico were in line with 
predicted values and for the region as a whole exports were 10.9 per cent above 
predicted values. While this may seem surprising, it is quite consistent with 
Table 1, where Britain is shown as exporting 4.5 per cent of all its exports to 
Latin America in 1960 - a very high ratio compared with more recent years. 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The 1960s were years of intense import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) in 
Latin America coupled with the construction of regional integration schemes. 
This encouraged trade diversion at Britain's expense, while Britain herself began 
to concentrate more on Europe. By 1970 (see Table 6) British exports to Latin 
America were underperforming, although the degree of underperformance was a 
modest 12.6 per cent. This time, however, British exports to Argentina were 
below the predicted value as their composition (predominantly consumer goods) 
made them vulnerable to ISI. By 1970 British exports to Mexico were also 
underperforming - a position from which they have never recovered. One factor 
was the boom in maquiladoras, bringing with it a huge increase in imports from 
the USA rather than Britain. 
Britain was still underperforming in 1980, although the overall degree of 
underperformance (12.1 per cent) was similar to 1970 (12.6 per cent). British 
exports to Argentina had recovered, but this was almost certainly due to the 
import boom inspired by the overvalued currency during the Proceso 
government. Britain, however, was underperforming for the first time in the 
crucial Brazilian market, where ISI was being pushed to extreme levels. UK 
exports were now below the predicted level in all markets except Argentina, 
Chile, Peru and the rest of South America.24 
The results for 1990 were truly dismal for British exports. The overall degree 
of British underperformance widened to 62.5 per cent and there were only three 
markets (Chile, Venezuela and the rest of South America) in which Britain 
overperformed. The underperformance was in part the result of the extremely 
low level of exports to Argentina (a consequence of the trade embargo that was 
only lifted in mid-1990), but Britain also underperformed massively in exports to 
Brazil and Mexico. Throughout Latin America the impact of the debt crisis was 
still being felt in 1990, with the need for trade surpluses generated through 
import restrictions in order to provide resources to service the debt. 
The overall picture presented in Table 6 is therefore quite complicated. As 
late as 1960, British exports to Latin America were still higher than predicted by 
the gravity model. Most of the overperformance is explained by exports to 
Argentina, but even without Argentina, exports were still in line with predicted 
values. By 1970 British underperformance was established, but the degree of 
underperformance was modest. Indeed, if 3.9 per cent of British exports had 
gone to Latin America in that year rather than the observed 3.5 per cent, there 
would have been no underperformance. 
Much the same was true in 1980. The boom in bank lending allowed imports 
to accelerate to unsustainable levels, creating opportunities for British exporters. 
Argentina, Chile and Peru, where exchange rate policies were particularly 
favourable to imports, all represented markets where British exporters 
The rest of South America' includes the Col6n Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in Panama, used by 
British - and other - exporters as a point of distribution for other countries. The Colon FTZ boomed 
in the 1970s and this may explain why underperformance in 'the rest of South America' in 1960 and 
1970 subsequently becomes overperformance. 
overperformed. At the aggregate level, Britain only needed to raise its exports to 
Latin America from 2.2 per cent in 1980 to 2.5 per cent to have avoided 
underperformance. 
By 1990 underperformance was much more marked. The export ratio of 1.3 
per cent (see Table 1) would have had to be raised to 2.1 per cent to avoid the 
charge of underperformance. Much of the poor performance was due to the trade 
embargo with Argentina and the huge trade surplus built up by Brazil, although 
the level of exports to Mexico was also very disappointing. 
The underperformance hypothesis is therefore upheld, but the degree of 
underperformance has not been as severe as is widely assumed. In particular, a 
doubling of Britain's share of Latin America's imports - which British 
governments since 1995 have set as their objective - would go beyond what is 
required to eliminate underperformance. A more modest increase in market share 
of approximately 50 per cent would have been sufficient for predicted and 
observed export values to be approximately equal even in 1990. 
The econometric test outlined in this section is, as far as I know, the first of 
its kind for UK exports to Latin America. The gravity model used in the test is 
well established in the literature on international trade, and the results are both 
robust and plausible. It should not, however, be applied mechanistically. The 
independent variables capture structural features of partner economies, but they 
do not reflect policy changes. When, for example, a partner country lowers tariffs 
this will lead ceteris paribus to higher British exports, although the model does 
not predict this. In the last ten years, Latin American countries have adopted 
trade liberalisation with tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions. Thus, the impact 
on British exports of the trade policy changes in Latin America since 1990 needs 
to be analysed from a different perspective. This is the issue examined in the next 
part of the paper. 
Performance since 1990 
The 1990s have at last seen a reversal in the trend for British exports to Latin 
America. As Table 1 shows, for the first time since 1950, the ratio of British 
exports to Latin America has increased. The increase has been very modest (1.4 
per cent in 1995 compared with 1.3 per cent in 1990), but nonetheless welcome. 
The reasons for the improvement in performance are not hard to find. The 
end of the trade embargo has seen a big increase in British exports to Argentina 
(see Table 7); these now represent some ten per cent of all British exports to 
Latin America (see Table 4) compared with almost zero in the aftermath of the 
South Atlantic conflict. British exports to Brazil have also surged as ISI policies 
have been replaced by trade liberalisation with lower tariffs and an end to non-
tariff barriers. Indeed, the switch in trade policies has led to a major increase in 
British exports to many markets in Latin America (see Table 7). 
Latin America's imports have almost trebled since 1990. The return of capital 
flows, including flight capital, the lowering of trade barriers and the growth of 
the regional economies have all created opportunities for British exporters. 
Indeed, it would have been very surprising if British exports had failed to 
respond and the increase in the share of British exports destined for Latin 
America since 1990 (see Table 1) is unremarkable given that total Latin 
American imports have been growing much faster than total British exports. 
Table 7. UK Exports to Latin America: 1990-96 ($Million) 
Argentina 65 520 +700 
Brazil 589 1323 +125 
Chile 231 259 +12 
Colombia 111 283 +155 
Mexico 469 496 +6 
Peru 51 98 +92 
Venezuela 370 281 -24 
Rest of South America (a) 187 378 +102 
Central America 123 157 +28 
Rest of Latin America (b) 46 96 +109 
TOTAL 2242 3891 +74 
Source: IMF (1997). 
Notes: 
(a) Includes Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
(b) Includes Cuba, Haiti and Dominican Republic. 
The British share of the fast-growing Latin American import market is, 
therefore, a better guide to British export performance. Here the picture since 
1990 has been very disappointing (see Table 8). With the exception of 
Argentina, where market share has risen as a result of the end of the trade 
embargo, trade shares have tended to fall. A small increase in market share in 
Brazil has been almost the only bright spot in an otherwise dismal picture. In 
Mexico, which now accounts for 40 per cent of all Latin America's imports, the 
British share has declined from 2.0 per cent in 1990 to a negligible 0.8 per cent 
in 1996. Indeed, Mexico now occupies the place formerly held by Argentina in 
terms of Latin America's imports, but in the case of Mexico it is the USA - not 
Britain - that has the dominant market share. 
The paradox of increased export share with declining import share can only 
be explained by the exceptionally fast growth of Latin American imports. 
Consider, for example, the case of Colombia. British exports have doubled since 
1990, while the UK share of Colombia's imports has fallen by nearly a quarter 
(see Table 8). As Latin America's imports grow more slowly, as is now 
happening in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the ratio of British exports 
1990 1996 lVrctiita»f Change 
destined to Latin America may again decline. 
The British failure to maintain, yet alone increase, its market share since 1990 
is disappointing in view of the greater attention paid to the region by successive 
British governments. A pilot scheme for Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela) was 
adopted, designed to emulate the successful British model for Kuwait in the early 
1990s and the Link Into Latin America (LILA) scheme was launched in 1995. 
British ministers have been frequent visitors to Latin America in recent years and 
John Major became the first British prime minister to make an official visit to the 
region in 1992. Trade missions have become more sophisticated and export 
credits are once again available for almost all markets. Yet it is clear from Table 
8 that the strategy has failed. 
Table 8. UK Shares of Latin America's imports (%): 1990-96 
Source: IMF (1997). 
Part of the problem, as in the 1960s, has been the rise of regional integration 
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other, they must import proportionately less from other countries. Tariff 
reductions in Latin America have not been particularly helpful for the consumer 
goods, such as whisky, which still account for a high share of British exports. Yet 
other countries outside Latin America, notably the United States, have preserved 
their share of the fast-growing Latin American import market, forcing us to 
conclude that the poor performance lies with Britain rather than with Latin 
America. 
There is no shortage of hypotheses for explaining Britain's poor performance. 
It has been argued that imports from Britain are now sourced in some cases from 
British subsidiaries in the USA, where they are classed as US exports. The cost 
of export credit is said to be high in comparison with Britain's competitors in 
Europe. British exporters have a preference for markets in which English is 
spoken.25 British exports are biased towards Commonwealth countries, where the 
playing field is tilted in Britain's favour by history and cultural ties. Britain's 
comparative advantage lies in service exports, which are not recorded in the 
trade statistics with Latin America. There is, no doubt, some truth in all these 
explanations, but it is impossible, with the limited research published thus far, to 
establish the relative importance of each hypothesis. 
The main source of consolation for Britain is that the UK share of inward 
investment remains high and is much higher than its share of Latin America's 
imports. This historical pattern, observed since Independence, reflects Britain's 
strength as a financial centre and an exporter of capital. And the changes in the 
British economy over the last 20 years have reinforced these trends; the 
elimination of exchange control in 1979, the privatisation programme in the 
1980s and the growth of country funds in the 1990s have allowed the United 
Kingdom, with its financial centres in London and Edinburgh, to compete with 
the United States as a source of capital for Latin America. 
These divergent trends - weak in trade, strong in investment - are likely to 
continue in the future. Britain will find it very difficult to increase its share of the 
Latin American import market, given the importance of Mexico (where the UK is 
particularly weak) and of MERCOSUR (where the UK may suffer from trade 
diversion). A Free Trade Agreement between the EU and both Mexico and 
MERCOSUR might improve the situation, but these agreements will take many 
years to come to fruition. It is in the area of investment - both direct and 
portfolio - that Britain will find the best opportunities and here it is encouraging 
to see the growth of interest among British companies in recent years. 
This is supported by the coefficient on the Common Language Dummy in Table 5. 
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